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On 15 December 2020, the European Commission released the long awaited
proposal for the Digital Services Act (DSA), amending the E-Commerce Directive
2000/31. First impressions (see here and here) of the proposal mention that the DSA
introduces Good Samaritan protection into the EU intermediary liability regime. A
possibility of introducing such a protection was discussed earlier (see Joan Barata
here). Upon further examination, however, it is clear that the new protection is yet
something else.
Protecting “Good Samaritans”
In the United States, internet intermediaries – among others, social media platforms
like Twitter and Facebook – enjoy “Good Samaritan” protection per Section 230
(47 U.S.C. § 230). Section 230(c) provides that online intermediaries should not
be held liable for any voluntary actions taken in good faith against certain types of
objectionable content. In particular, it refers to content that “the provider or user
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”
The aim of this provision was to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy, where
an online service provider was found liable for defamatory content uploaded by
third parties, because it had tried to detect and remove the objectionable content,
but had failed to do so completely. Section 230 also provides that intermediaries
shall not be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.
Section 230 essentially protects intermediaries when they act with good intentions to
restrict access to or availability of content. But it also protects intermediaries when
they do not act against such content, regardless of whether they have knowledge of
it or not (provided that this is not content excluded from the scope of Section 230 (c),
such as content that violates federal criminal law, e.g. certain child abuse material
or terrorist content). The broad protection has been confirmed by extensive case
law (see blog of Eric Goldman). Section 230 is considered as a crucial provision that
enabled the development of the internet as we know it today (see Jeff Kosseff, The
Twenty Six Words That Created the Internet).
While Section 230 is subject to increasing criticism in the United States, this will not
be discussed further here (for an overview of proposals to amend Section 230 see
here).
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No “Good Samaritan” protection under the E-
Commerce Directive
In the European Union, the E-Commerce Directive (ECD) does not explicitly
protect internet intermediaries involved in good faith measures against illegal or
inappropriate content. Instead, the Directive focuses on knowledge of illegal content,
either actual, or constructive.
Per Article 14 ECD, hosting providers can benefit from a liability exemption for
hosted speech on condition that they (1) do not have actual knowledge of illegal
activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, are not aware of facts or
circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent (constructive
knowledge); (2) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, they act expeditiously
to remove or to disable access to the information.
Article 15 ECD prohibits Member States from introducing obligations of general
monitoring for intermediaries. However, both specific monitoring obligations and
voluntary monitoring on the intermediaries’ own initiative are allowed. But voluntary
monitoring could be tricky, as it could lead to awareness of facts or circumstances
from which an illegal activity or information is apparent, and therefore to obtaining
constructive knowledge (see more here). As a result, voluntary monitoring could lead
to loss of the liability exemption for hosting providers. Nevertheless, the European
Commission (EC) has already for quite some time been trying to encourage hosting
providers to take up a more proactive approach to content moderation on their
services.
Towards Good Samaritan protection in the EU?
The EC has stimulated voluntary removal of content in, for example, the 2016  Code
of Conduct on hate speech, the 2017 Communication on Tackling Illegal Content, or
the 2018 Recommendation on Measures to Effectively Tackle Illegal Content Online.
Inviting private companies to voluntarily monitor, remove or otherwise decrease the
visibility of undesirable content raises freedom of expression concerns (see more
here on “interference by proxy”). At the same time, private companies are, strictly
speaking, not directly bound by human rights instruments, and the safeguarding of
rights or freedoms. An invitation to voluntarily police content also circumvents the
general monitoring prohibition of Article 15 ECD, as there is no obligation to monitor,
only encouragement. But how to successfully convince intermediaries to engage
in voluntary measures, if it could deprive them of the immunity offered by Article 14
ECD?
The EC has entertained the idea of introducing a type of European Good Samaritan
protection for some time. The idea was most prominently expressed in the
2017 Communication on Tackling Illegal Content, which referred to proactive
measures as ‘so-called “Good Samaritan” actions’. The EC argued that undertaking
proactive measures would not automatically lead to a loss of the liability exemption
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provided for in Article 14 ECD. The reason being that under Article 14 ECD, to claim
immunity, hosts already have to act expeditiously when they obtain knowledge or
awareness. As I have written previously, the EC’s interpretation offered only half of
the Good Samaritan protection. Intermediaries in the EU would not lose the immunity
if they took voluntary action resulting in the removal of unlawful or infringing content,
but they would not be protected if they did not act (either as a result of a conscious
decision or by omission).
The DSA update
How do the EC’s efforts for Good Samaritan protection translate into the DSA? The
Explanatory Memorandum to the DSA clarifies that the rules on intermediaries build
on the ECD. The proposal reproduces the old Articles 12-15 ECD (now Articles 3, 4,
5, and 7) and provides some additional clarifications. For example, Recital 18 states
that the liability exemptions should not apply when the provider, instead of providing
the services neutrally, by a merely technical and automatic processing of the
information provided by the recipient of the service, “plays an active role of such a
kind as to give it knowledge of, or control over, that information.” That codifies earlier
interpretations, as well as CJEU rulings in  Google France and  L’Oréal v. eBay, that
providing ‘active’ services may lead to the loss of immunity if knowledge could be
established. Article 6 DSA is where some might argue a Good Samaritan protection
could be found. It aims to eliminate existing disincentives towards voluntary own-
investigations undertaken by internet intermediaries:
“Providers of intermediary services shall not be deemed ineligible for the exemptions
from liability referred to in Articles 3, 4 and 5 solely because they carry out voluntary
own-initiative investigations or other activities aimed at detecting, identifying
and removing, or disabling of access to, illegal content, or take the necessary
measures to comply with the requirements of Union law, including those set out in
this Regulation.”
In other words, voluntary measures taken by intermediaries on their own initiative
should not be the sole reason for the loss of immunity. Recital 25 of the proposal
explains that “the mere fact that providers undertake such activities does not lead to
the unavailability of the exemptions from liability,” if those activities are undertaken
“in good faith and in a diligent manner.” This applies to activities taken to comply
with the requirements of EU law, including those set out in the DSA “as regards the
implementation of their terms and conditions.” The latter is an interesting addition
because removals on the basis of terms and conditions are easier and faster for
hosts, since they award more discretion to remove content that is unwanted but not
necessarily illegal. The recital adds that any such activities should not be taken into
account when determining if the service is provided in a neutral manner.
Recital 25 concludes that the rule on determination of neutrality does not imply “that
the provider can necessarily rely thereon.” In other words, taking voluntary actions
in good faith neither guarantees not precludes neutrality. The possibility of losing
immunity still exists. Could that be the case when the host undertakes voluntary
actions but not particularly successful ones? Would unsuccessful voluntary actions
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be considered as not undertaken in a “diligent manner”? Could it actually discourage
hosts from taking one-time voluntary decisions in particular cases if no coherent
framework for ‘diligence’ is in place?
Moreover, as specified in Recital 22, to benefit from the liability exemption, providers
of hosting services should act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to
content upon obtaining actual knowledge or awareness of its illegal character. Such
knowledge or awareness can be obtained through own-initiative investigations or
notices submitted by individuals or entities in accordance with the DSA. So, even
though voluntary actions by providers would not mean automatic loss of immunity,
in specific cases, they might lead to knowledge. For example, if a moderator trained
to review for one type illegality (e.g. incitement to violence) looked at a video, but
failed to recognize that it contained another type (e.g. defamation). In such a case,
not removing content could still result in liability because the host ‘knew’ or ‘should
have known’ about the illegality.
More protection but only for more take-downs?
Article 6 DSA is an interesting addition to the EU intermediary liability regime. The
provision clearly attempts to incentivize hosting providers to take more initiative
against illegal content, but also content that may violate their self-set terms and
conditions, without an immediate risk of losing immunity. This is, of course, welcome
from the perspective of hosting providers, as it allows them to moderate content
without necessarily being considered as “active”. It also furthers policy-makers’ goal
to have intermediaries “do more” content policing without violating the prohibition of
general monitoring obligation. At the same time, it is questionable whether facilitating
more voluntary removals is actually beneficial from the perspective of users and their
right to freedom of expression.
Hosting providers who, until now, may have preferred to remain modest in their
voluntary monitoring attempts, because of the risk of being considered active
providers with knowledge, need no longer have such qualms. The effect of Article
6 DSA, therefore, could be more content removals. It would be safer for the hosting
providers to remain cautious and remove more, rather than less, in avoidance of
liability. This outcome would be at odds with one of the goals of the DSA proposal:
to ensure more protection for fundamental rights online, in particular the freedom of
expression (e.g. in Recitals 3, 22, 41, and 42). It could also deprive the statement
in Recital 22, that the “removal or disabling of access should be undertaken in the
observance of the principle of freedom of expression,” of any deeper meaning. At
the same time, as pointed out earlier, conducting the voluntary actions in a less than
diligent manner may lead to the loss of immunity, possibly creating an obstacle for
more ad hoc voluntary action. Is this contradiction introduced in the text on purpose
to balance out the two possible outcomes? And if so, does the new provision actually




It will be interesting to see if and how Article 6 DSA evolves during the legislative
process. It seems that its main outcome could be more removals by hosting
providers on their own initiative, rather than increased protection of the right to
freedom of expression. In that sense, the effect would be quite different than the one
of Section 230. But several questions remain. Most notably, it is not immediately
clear from the text if providers that attempted to take voluntary actions, but were
unsuccessful, would still be protected. A case-by-case analysis (e.g. looking at the
technology used) would be necessary. Hopefully, the final text of Article 6 DSA
will bring more clarity. In any case, it might be time we all stop referring to the new
protection as a Good Samaritan clause – the DSA does not use the term – as it has
very little in common with its Section 230 counterpart.
The author would like to thank Daphne Keller for her helpful feedback.
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